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This study analyses Theresa May‟s three seminal Brexit speeches. These describe the kind of desirable post-
Brexit EU-UK relationship that she envisioned, and together constitute a corpus of 18,532 words. The speeches 
can be considered as landmarks on a timeline that was initially meant to lead to the delivery of Brexit. It is 
hypothesized that there may be meaningful differences between the speeches, and that these affect the 
representation of reality. These in turn would have a bearing on May‟s discursive self-representation as either an 
individualized or a collectivized social actor. To account for such representational values, the study draws on 
Halliday‟s Transitivity System (1994), starting from the clause and its potential to express ideational meanings. 
With the aim of uncovering more convincing and interesting findings, a statistical analysis is applied. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: POLITICAL SPEECHES 
In the context of Critical Discourse Analysis (henceforth CDA) political discourse behaviour 
has received a great deal of attention from researchers, with interest ranging from racism, 
nationalism, elitism and migration to various other concerns of a socio-political or socio- 
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economic nature (see e.g.: Billig, 1995; Chilton & Schäffner, 2002; Fairclough, 1995; 
Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012; Fairclough, Mulderrig & Wodak, 2006; Filardo-Llamas & 
Boyd (2018); Van Dijk, 1993, 1995, 1997, 2006; Wodak, 1989). Whatever the specific focus 
of the critical discourse approach, these types of study share an interest in the particular 
dialectical relationships that are created, in which the discursive event is shaped by specific 
institutional and social structures which, in turn, are conditioned by the discursive behavior 
itself. 
1.1. Political speeches 
 
With regard to the context of politics, I am particularly interested in the representational value 
underlying political speeches. This discourse practice has often been analyzed in terms of its 
argumentative rhetorical structure. A speech, according to Finlayson & Martin (2008: 450), is 
“an argument of some kind; an attempt to provide others with reasons for thinking, feeling or 
acting in a particular way.” It is also an institutionalized social practice, involving constraints 
on what counts as legitimate contributions to a goal or task (Thornborrow, 2002: 2-4), an 
asymmetrical one-directional persuasive talk that politicians address to the electorate. Political 
speeches, she adds, do not „expire‟ the moment they are delivered, but are often recorded, 
transcribed and quoted, and can be evoked for various purposes at any future time. 
The persuasive component is certainly a defining characteristic and has attracted interest 
from traditional research approaches to classical rhetoric and oratory. Budd (2015), Charteris-
Black (2004, 2013), Harmon (2017) and Savoy (2010) focus on the use of metaphor as an 
essential figure of speech to understand argumentative behavior. Metaphors, as Charteris-
Black (2013: 6-7) observes, is key in persuasion and is frequently employed in political 
speeches, given its potential to represent a novel way of viewing the world.  
Schaffner (1996: 201) highlights how carefully prepared and linguistically controlled 
argumentative behavior in political speeches is, with a thoroughly planned discourse 
management that leaves little or no space for spontaneous talk on the part of the politician 
delivering the speech (see also Hillier, 2004 and Chilton, 2004). Given the kind of linguistic 
control underlying political speeches, it comes as no surprise that research on the use of lexis 
and grammar has received a great deal of attention towards accounting for argumentative 
behaviour. Hillier (2004: 126-127) points to personal pronouns as well as lexical and 
grammatical repetition as the main elements on which persuasion hinges.  
As for personal pronouns, we might note Simon-Vandenbergen‟s (1987) study 
comparing the incidence of I versus We-pronouns in political debates. While the first-person 
singular is characteristic of individualized personal speech, it is argued, the plural counterpart 
lends itself to more strategic possibilities (1987: 265-266), in that inclusive We may integrate 
a series of agents and elements which themselves may be presented in a concealed, non-
explicit manner. In later work, Simon-Vandenbergen (1997: 353) has noted that politicians‟ 
use of the personal pronoun I serves the purpose of setting up a personal profile, while the use 
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of plural We is meant to establish a sense of solidarity between politician and audience, 
making the addressees feel that the politician is one of them and identifies with them. 
Similarly, Fairclough (2000: 95-105) associates politicians‟ frequent use of I with an attempt 
to appear to have a strong personal identity, while We-pronoun is meant to convey feelings of 
solidarity with the audience. Hillier (2004: 131) and Chilton (2004: 56) consider the 
representational possibilities underlying the choice of plural We, with Hillier noting its 
potential to convey ambiguous meaning, in that it may be either inclusive or exclusive of 
addressees, and Chilton associating this reference with group identity, coalitions, or parties in 
terms of insiders versus outsiders. 
Discursive studies on political speeches often focus on social agency, and in their 
attempt to portray a specific situation or political figure have addressed iconic or powerful 
politicians. A good example is Svensson‟s (2018) study on how Jean-Claude Juncker 
represents European identity but also projects himself as a social actor. Likewise, in the Brexit 
context, Harmon (2017), using Fairclough & Fairclough‟s (2012) practical reasoning model, 
analyses the candidacy speech of Andrea Leadsom, which was intended to portray this 
unexpected and internationally unknown candidate for the leadership of the British 
Conservative Party after David Cameron‟s resignation. 
Political speeches have also been analyzed as a means of assessing how politicians 
make use of evaluative devices, resorting to positive or negative attitude markers, judgement 
or appreciation markers, either for criticizing their adversaries, or for praising a person‟s 
capacities or qualities (Cabrejas-Peñuelas & Díez-Prados, 2014: 161). Much of the research 
on the use of evaluative devices in political speeches has been developed under the Appraisal 
Theory framework (see Ananko, 2017).  
Evaluation is also expressed through the notion of modality, a concept of great 
importance in politics, since politicians are often characterized in terms of their stance and 
various viewpoints or social positions (White, 2003: 259). Modality may account for 
politicians‟ attitudes towards the content of their propositions and has proved to be at work in 
the projection of ideological potential (Simon-Vandenbergen, 1997: 344). As to political 
speeches in particular, we might note the study by Pinna (2007) which analyses the use of 
modal verbs in combination with epistemic formulas such as I know, I believe and there is no 
doubt in presidential speeches; these extended units of meaning, it is argued, manage to 
reflect and consolidate specific world views and systems of values (Pinna, 2007: 449). 
Research into political speeches has also arisen from Systemic Functional Linguistic 
transitivity analysis (henceforth SFL, see e.g., Fawcett, 2010; Halliday & Matthiessen, 2004; 
Halliday & Webster, 2014). This approach is concerned with what people do with language, 
starting from specific choices of lexico-grammatical items contained in systemic networks 
(Bloor & Bloor, 2018: 151). Meaning fulfils the three components of the semantic system 
known as metafunctions, termed ideational, interpersonal and textual meanings, and which 
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every clause may embrace (Halliday & Mathiessen, 2004: 29-31). Yuqiong & Fengjie (2018), 
tracing the ideational component in a speech by David Cameron which sought to persuade the 
Scottish electorate not to vote for an independent Scottish nation, found that Cameron relied 
mostly on relational and material process types of representation of reality, which were 
associated with traits of objectivity. In Adjei et al. (2015) the ideational component is 
considered in the first State-of-the-Nation address by Ghana‟s ex-president John Evans Attah 
Mills, tracing his hypothetical manipulative behavior therein; material processes are identified 
as the most frequently occurring, these associated with the president‟s attempt to create a false 
sense of developmental progress. 
In this context, Leung‟s (2018) analysis of May‟s ministerial discourse on the 
withdrawal of Britain from the EU is of special interest, as it is probably the closest to the 
focus of the present study. Relying on the SFL framework, the avoidance of first-person 
singular pronoun I in favor of the first-person plural pronoun We is found to be underpinned 
by ideology, and interpreted as a way of diverting excessive prominence from herself, 
integrating Europe in the inclusive We to emphasize solidarity and connection with the EU 
(Leung, 2018: 61). 
Given that we are dealing here with a woman in power, research in the context of 
gendered mediation around May‟s political persona is expected, as is the comparison with 
former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Williams (2020) examines the gendered 
differences of these two women political leaders from the masculine leadership norm and 
finds more biased media attention being paid to May than to Thatcher. On the same lines, 
conducting a socio-semantic analysis of Theresa May‟s representation in three leading 
Spanish digital publications, Arrieta-Castillo & Berdasco-Gancedo (2020: 255) find that she 
is frequently allocated the role of culprit, malefactor or failure in the Brexit talks, and 
conclude that “the lack of courage or bravery attributed to the British politician connects with 
the tradition of representing women as individuals not suited for positions of great 
responsibility.” 
An interesting inquiry into what we might call a typical linguistic style that would 
characterize May‟s speech behaviour is offered by Bull & Strawson (2020). The authors 
extend the typologies devised for the analysis of equivocation in broadcast political interviews 
to May‟s performances at sessions of Prime Minister‟s Questions (PMQs), identifying a 
distinctive equivocation style, one which implies an intentional lack of clarity, confusion, and 
concealment, which may have an important bearing on how she represents reality in her 
speeches. 
In the present study I will consider Theresa May‟s representation of reality in the three 
seminal speeches she delivered in the context of Brexit. Adopting an SFL approach, I trace at 
the clause construction level specific lexico-grammatical choices that she makes as a means of  
representing the world. The use of the I versus We-pronoun has proved to be an interesting 
lexico-grammatical device here, not only in the expression of linguistic control and discourse 
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management, but also as a strategic element underlying argumentative behaviour and hence as 
an ideological device (e.g., Fairclough, 2000; Hillier, 2004; Simon-Vandenbergen, 1987). The 
I-We dichotomy is also associated with the importance of social agency in the study of 
political speeches (Catalano, 2011; Harmon, 2017; Svensson, 2018). By tracing May‟s 
pronominal choices, projecting herself in subject position either as an individualized or a 
collectivized social actor, we can capture essential elements in her political persona and 
understand some of the strategic potential behind these choices. 
The contextualization of May‟s so-called Brexit speeches is important: Theresa May 
became Prime Minister (PM) following the UK‟s vote to leave the European Union on June 
24, 2016 and David Cameron‟s subsequent resignation. In keeping with the result of the 
referendum, she committed to guaranteeing a smooth Brexit transition. On January 17, 2017 
May delivered a speech to an audience of diplomats at London‟s Lancaster House, in which 
she set out her key priorities for the upcoming Brexit negotiations and her plans for a post-
Brexit Britain. The importance of a customs agreement with the EU was said to be of 
paramount importance, as well as the need for an implementation period in the interest of the 
economies of both the EU and the UK (Dominiczak, January 2017, online).  
Despite a series of EU-UK negotiations addressing the complex issue of the Irish 
border, and with European Council President Donald Tusk formally confirming the UK‟s 
departure from the EU, the talks led by May were considered not to be progressing quickly 
enough. This led to May‟s speech in Florence on the 22
nd
 of September 2017, in which a clear 
attempt was made to convince the European Commission that work was in progress and hence 
that the parties involved could move on to a more consolidating second phase of negotiations. 
May referred to the importance of a transition period between the date of the UK‟s departure 
from the EU and the commencement of the new trading relationships, while insisting on the 
most advantageous scenario for post-Brexit trade with the EU (Henley, September 2017, 
online). 
A third Brexit speech was given on March 2, 2018 at the Mansion House, London. 
Although May and EU leaders had agreed some terms by November 2017, these were rejected 
in the UK Parliament. The EU urged May to delay the UK‟s departure if a deal was not 
agreed before March 29, 2019, the initial deadline for Britain‟s exit. At the Mansion House, 
May clarified the terms agreed so far, insisting on a desirable post-Brexit trade relationship 
between the UK and the EU (Asthana, March 2018, online). 
The three speeches can be seen as conforming to one unit, in that they all fall within the 
category of seminal speeches: (1) all three deal with key moments during the Brexit 
negotiations; (2) they all revolve around a desirable new post-Brexit relationship between the 
UK and the EU; and (3) their comparable length and the time span separating them indicate 
that they can be understood as similar and comparable events.  
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It is these three characteristics which also allow us to understand each speech as 
representing a landmark on the timeline that would eventually lead to Brexit. This allows us 
to explore both May‟s self-representation and her representation of reality in her speech-
giving behaviour as a whole, but also to consider hypothetical changes between the speeches 
as the initial Brexit deadline, scheduled for March 29, 2019, approached. The two hypotheses 
to be addressed in this study, and the corresponding research questions, are then: 
H.1. Considering the three speeches as landmarks on a timeline that was initially intended to 
lead to the delivery of Brexit, I assume that there will be meaningful differences between the 
speeches, affecting the representation of the reality of the EU-UK relationship. These, I assume, 
will have a bearing on Theresa May‟s discursive self-representation. 
RQ1: Are there any statistically meaningful differences between speech 1 and speech 3 (with a 
fourteen-month time span) and speech 1 and speech 2 (with an eight-month time difference) in 
terms of the representation of reality? 
 
H.2. Given the persuasive nature of the speeches, I also assume that former PM May will 
project herself as a social actor in accordance with a hypothetical strategic interest underlying 
the choice of an individualized vs collectivized self-representation. 
RQ2: Are there any statistically meaningful differences between May‟s three speeches in terms 
of her discursive self-representation, either as an individual or as pertaining to a group? 
 
Before I set out the methodological framework and procedure, I followed for data 
collection and coding, I will briefly discuss the key concepts relevant to the study: ideational 
meaning, clause construction patterns and their expression of processes of the representation 
of reality, agency and social actor, and the pronoun I versus We dichotomy in agentive 
position.   
 
2. IDEATIONAL MEANING: REPRESENTATION OF REALITY 
Chilton & Schäffner (2002: 25) argue that if we want to gain insights into any ideological 
expression in discourse behaviour, we should look either at its textual features, at the 
interactional component, or at its elements of representation. As the authors observe, these are 
inextricably linked to Halliday‟s (1994) textual, interpersonal and ideational meta-functions of 
language. Of these three components of the semantic system, the ideational function is of 
particular significance in the present study, inasmuch as “it considers the grammatical 
resources provided to construe, at clause level, meanings of the world, giving rise to possible 
representations of reality” (Bloor & Bloor, 2018: 151).  
A clause construction pattern may lead to six possible categories of the representational 
processes of reality. These are termed material process (interpreted in terms of „doing‟, 
expressing the notion that some entity „does‟ something, optionally to some other entity; this 
giving rise to the participant roles of Actor and Goal, respectively), verbal process 
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(interpreted in terms of „saying‟, recreating the participant roles of Sayer for the speaker, and 
Receiver for the intended recipient of the message), mental process (this integrates perception 
–seeing, hearing–, affection –liking, fearing– and cognition –thinking, knowing, 
understanding–, recreating the participant role of Senser), relational process (this includes 
intensive processes of being –establishing a relationship of sameness between two entities–, 
and circumstantial processes –defining the entity in terms of location or time–,invariably 
creating the participant roles of Identifier and Identified), behavioural processes (indicating 
an activity in which physical and mental aspects are inseparable, as in the case of laugh, with 
only one participant role, termed Behaver), and existential processes (when relating to 
something that exists or happens, expressed through impersonal there, the nominal group 
adopting the role of the Existent) (see Halliday, 1994; Halliday & Webster, 2014).  
The clause, in its potential to render the representations noted above, projects the 
subject in agentive position as an Actor (doer), a Sayer, a Senser, an Identifier, a Behaver, or 
an Existent. Whatever the complexity behind this nomenclature, these names converge in the 
concepts of agency and social actor, which are relevant for the present study, in that the focus 
lies in Theresa May‟s self-representation while delivering her speeches, her role as agent 
being grammatically encoded through either a We or an I-subject. Since I rely on these inter-
related concepts when looking at how she projects herself, it is worth briefly accounting for 
their specificities. 
From a CDA perspective, agency entails looking into the subject‟s potential for 
controlling other people‟s behaviour. Duranti (2004: 453) endows the subject in agentive 
position with the linguistic ability to describe real and imaginary worlds, where word choices 
and combinations are viewed as acts that always do (and mean) something, and hence always 
convey an ideological position. Van Leeuwen (1996: 32-70) proposes the concept of social 
actor, setting out a socio-semantic inventory for understanding the ways in which these social 
actors can be discursively represented. He proposes categories for their classification that can 
be seen as pan-semiotic, with generalized representational possibilities. These involve 
categories such as generic vs specific, excluded vs included, individualized vs collectivized 
social actors, to mention just a few. It is the latter dichotomy, which is of specific interest in 
the present study, leading us to the options of an individualized I versus a collectivized We 
subject, as two choices available to Theresa May to project herself as a social actor in 
agentive position in her clause constructions. 
In discussing the results of the present study, I will focus particularly on May‟s choices 
of either I or We-pronoun in agentive position, with specific reference to the relevant authors 
discussed in the review section above (Simon-Vandenbergen, 1987, 1997; Fairclough, 2000; 
Chilton, 2004, Hillier, 2004; Leung, 2018).  
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3. METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURE 
The three so-called Brexit speeches, as delivered by PM Theresa May, were considered in 
their entirety for analysis here. The resulting corpus contained a total of 18,532 words, 
distributed as follows. 
1) The Lancaster House speech (January 17, 2017): 6,444 words 
2) The Florence speech (September 22, 2017): 5,379 words 
3) The Mansion House speech (March 2, 2018): 6,709 words 
 
These speeches were seen as seminal, in that they attracted a great deal of attention 
worldwide and sparked heated debate, in both the UK and the EU. The three speeches all 
revolve around a new and desirable post-Brexit relationship between the EU and the UK. 
They are also related, inasmuch as they represent fairly well-spaced reference points on a 
timeline that would eventually lead to the Brexit divorce: the time between speech one and 
two was eight months, and between the second and third, six months; the three speeches, then, 
covered a timespan of roughly fourteen months. 
The methodology was as follows: first, the concordancing tool AntConc3.5.8 was used 
to identify clauses that contained the first personal pronoun I or We in subject position. This 
made it possible to identify the choice of clause construction patterns that would place PM 
Theresa May in agentive position, both as an individualized and as a collectivized social 
actor. The eventual choice of eligible samples for analysis was done manually, to guarantee 
that the pronouns I and We were always invariably referring back to PM May and to her 
persona represented collectively as being part of the British people. Special attention was paid 
to the inclusive We to refer exclusively to the British people/the UK, and not integrating other 
group references (e.g., our political party, the conservatives, the government etc.). This 
yielded the corpus for the study, distributed as follows: 
Speech 1: 158 clauses, 53 with I in subject position, 105 with We in subject position 
Speech 2: 145 clauses, 41 with I in subject position, 104 with We in subject position 
Speech 3: 198 clauses, 42 with I in subject position, 156 with We in subject position 
 
 The resulting clause samples were then manually assigned to one of the six processes of 
representation of reality, according to Halliday‟s Transitivity System. There follows one 
random sample (number of speeches in brackets) to illustrate each representational choice 
identified in the corpus: 
Processes of representation of reality: I-subject (source of speech in brackets) 
 
MENTAL (desiderative–want) I want the broadest and deepest possible partnership (3) 
MENTAL  
(other verbs of volition) 
I hope that same spirit of unity will apply to Northern Ireland 
(1) 
MENTAL (cognitive verbs 
know, believe, think) 
I believe we can shape a new partnership (2) 
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MENTAL (perception) I can see how important it is to provide business, the public 
sector, and everybody else with as much certainty as possible 
(1) 
RELATIONAL I am optimistic about what we can achieve (2) 
VERBAL I have told other EU leaders that we could give people the 
certainty (1) 
MATERIAL I stood in Downing Street and addressed the nation (3) 
 
Processes of representation of reality: We-subject (source of speech in brackets) 
 
MENTAL (desiderative–want) We want to be the strongest friend and partner (2) 
MENTAL  
(other verbs of volition) 
We will need an arrangement for data protection (3) 
MENTAL (cognitive verbs 
know, believe, think) 
We believe a phased process of implementation is of mutual 
interest (1) 
MENTAL (perception) We see the country coming together (1) 
RELATIONAL We will no longer be members of its [European] single 
market 
(2) 
VERBAL We are also proposing a far reaching partnership (2) 
MATERIAL We are leaving the Common Agricultural Policy (3) 
 
The incidences for each representational process were quantified, noting the specific 
frequencies for each speech and corresponding process (see tables 1 and 2 below). Mental 
processes turned out to have the most notable frequency in all three speeches, allowing for a 
distribution into four specific subgroups: mental processes with the desiderative verb want, 
with other verbs of volition (a term coined for the expression of wishes and preferences) like 
desire, need, look forward to; mental processes with the specific verbs of cognition think, 
know, believe; and those with verbs of mental perception, such as see, perceive, notice.  
Towards arriving at reliable interpretations in terms of meanings, the statistical software 
SPSS 26.0 was used, and a chi-square test was run. This allowed for the comparison of two 
nominal variables, giving information about the degree of significance of the corresponding 
associations, ranging from non-significant (p>. 05), to significant (p <. 05). 
The study sought to confirm whether there were significant changes in the use of these 
representational choices over time, comparing each category from speech 1 with their 
counterparts from speech 2 (eight months later) and from speech 3 (after fourteen months). 
On the other hand, each of these representational choices was considered for each individual 
speech, comparing the clauses with an I subject with those with a We subject, to account for 
hypothetically significant choices in which May represented herself as either an 
individualized or a collectivized social actor. These comparisons yielded a total of fifty-six 
cross-tabulations between two variables each. Of these, only the significant associations are 
discussed below.  
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     4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The distribution of frequencies clearly shows that the use of the collective We pronoun 
significantly outstrips the use of the individualized I (see tables 1 and 2 below). There are 
three times as many uses of, We than I in the first speech, 3.5 as many in the second speech, 
and 4.7 as many in the third. These raw data seem to suggest a clear preference for Teresa 
May projecting herself in the Brexit speeches as part of a group, the British people, rather 
than as an individualized self, this tendency increasing as we get closer to what was initially 
held to be the Brexit deadline.  
Such an intensifying preference seems to correlate with the unfolding of political events 
relating to Brexit. In her first speech, after just six months as Prime Minister, having 
seemingly won the British people‟s trust as a guarantor of an advantageous resolution to 
Brexit negotiations, may still holds a strong position, viewed by many as an efficient 
negotiator. However, her position has deteriorated somewhat by the time of her second 
speech, coming after the general election of June 8
th
, 2017, in which she loses support, and 
when she is thought not to be making progress quickly enough, and further weakened at the 
time of the third, when the terms she has thus far agreed with the EU are rejected in the UK 
Parliament. The increasing frequency of We at the expense of ever fewer I-choices as time 
unfolds may be interpreted as a preference for presenting herself as part of the British people, 
where the inclusive We assimilates her agency with that of all UK citizens; a strategy, 
probably, to turn them into the social actors that share May‟s reality expressed in the clause, 
an inclusive We that dilutes responsibility.  
Table 1. Quantifications of representational processes for the three speeches: clauses with I subject.  
 
PROCESS Speech 1 
I subject 
PROCESS Speech 2 
I subject 










verbs of volition) 
5 MENTAL (other 
verbs of volition) 
2 MENTAL (other  




know, believe, think) 
11 MENTAL (cognitive 
verbs know, believe, 
think) 
13 MENTAL  











(sum of all) 
36 MENTAL  
(sum of all) 
24 MENTAL  
(sum of all) 
22 
RELATIONAL 12 RELATIONAL 6 RELATIONAL 6 
VERBAL 5 VERBAL 7 VERBAL 7 
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Table 2. Quantifications of representational processes for the three speeches: clauses with We subject.  
 
PROCESS Speech 1 
We subj. 
PROCESS Speech 2 
We subj. 










verbs of volition) 
21 MENTAL (other 
verbs of volition) 











6 MENTAL  
(cognitive verbs 










(sum of all) 
43 MENTAL  
(sum of all) 
35 MENTAL  
(sum of all) 
89 
RELATIONAL 17 RELATIONAL 18 RELATIONAL 20 
VERBAL 3 VERBAL 7 VERBAL 7 
MATERIAL 42 MATERIAL 44 MATERIAL 40 
 
 
The prominence of mental processes in the data for both I and We choices is 
unquestionable, representing the most frequent process type. In fact, the process type lends 
itself to further specifications, as shown in tables 1 and 2. We may conclude that May‟s 
representation of reality is preferably expressed in terms of what she wants, seeks, believes or 
perceives, projecting a social actor whose agency is primarily related to mental activity. At 
the other end of the scale, we have the very scant use of verbal processes, again for both I and 
We choices, which is interesting, since it implies a clear avoidance of coming across in her 
role as a speaker, with all the possibilities this might entail, as also would the act of making 
promises or claims (thus lending truth values to her words). Rather than embracing the 
function of a communicator, she sees the persuasive potential of her speeches as reaching the 
audience specifically from her own mental activity.   
The manifest difference in the use of material processes is certainly noteworthy; these 
are represented in the clauses where May projects herself from the We-perspective, while 
being very infrequent when talking as an individual. This is interesting, as material processes 
turn the agent in subject position into a doer, a performer, the action expressed conveying 
potential meanings of creation, or at least change. It seems clear that these are elements that 
May wants to include in her choice of process types (consider the very high frequency of the 
material process type in table 2), but only from a collective, inclusive, We-perspective, turning 
the British people into co-protagonists of all the possible actions entertained, instead of 
presenting them as conceived from her individual institutional role as Prime Minister. 
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To test my hypotheses and confirm whether there were significant changes in May‟s 
choice of processes of representation of reality over time, each category from speech 1 was 
compared with their counterparts from speech 2 (eight months‟ time difference) and from 
speech 3 (fourteen months‟ time difference). A chi-square test was run to confirm the 
statistical significance underlying the changes in frequencies. Findings showed that time 
(separating the speeches) was a statistically significant variable, but only for specific 
associations, which will be discussed below.  
More significant statistical differences were identified between the first and the third 
speech than between the first and second. This meaningfulness affects mental processes as a 
group (p<. 00) and specifically the subgroups of uses with desiderative want (p<. 01) along 
with other verbs of volition (p<. 00) whenever May chooses to project herself from the 
inclusive We-perspective. For the sum of mental processes, the shift is from 43 to 89 
occurrences, for desiderative want from 15 to 30, and for verbs of volition from 21 to 46. 
Roughly, after fourteen months‟ distance from the first speech, May practically doubles these 
incidences. This is interesting, as she seems to be attaching ever more importance to the 
inclusive We-reference, which integrates the British people, when representing a reality 
through the lens of the expression of wishes, desired outcomes, and mental processes in 
general as we approach the Brexit deadline, thus diverting her own individual self from these 
very mental processes, turning them into expressions of collective interest, thus making her 
mental activity coincide with that of the UK citizens.  
A further aim of this study was to see whether there were significant differences 
between May‟s self-portrayal in her speeches, in terms of the choice between an 
individualized I and a collectivized We. Since we have seen that the most significant changes 
relate to the time span of 14 months from the first to the third speech, it makes sense here to 
focus on these two landmarks in particular.  
As for the first speech, there is no incidence of Theresa May‟s projection in material 
processes from the I-perspective, while there are 42 from the We-position (p<. 00). In the 
same vein, whereas there are only 5 uses of verbs of volition with an I-subject, there are 21 
incidences with the collective We-subject (p<. 00). However, the reverse situation pertains for 
mental processes of cognition, where May clearly prefers to express herself from the 
individualized I-role as opposed to the collective We-position (11 versus 5 occurrences) (p<. 
01). Turning to the third speech, we find the same parallelism as far as the choice of verbs of  
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volition and material processes is concerned, the We-pronoun outstripping its singular 
counterpart (46 versus 4 for verbs of volition; 40 versus 7 for material processes). This is 
interesting, as it leads to a portrayal of Theresa May as a social actor who is intent on 
projecting herself in association with the British people when it comes to representing a 
reality that conveys action, creation, and ultimately change (material process) as well as 
desired outcomes (mental process-verbs of volition). And, most importantly, she does so not 
only in her first speech, from a strong position of power, but also in the third, when her role as 
negotiator has been significantly challenged, indeed diminished, by the UK parliament. 
Interestingly, in her first speech May does prefer the I-perspective when projecting herself as 
an agent in mental (verbs of cognition) processes, while talking about what she thinks, knows 
and believes. This individualization, which suggests assertiveness, makes sense in that she 
delivers her speech from a position of strength. We understand that this is no longer the case 
in the third speech, where We versus I-choices are on a par, her power having now become 
considerably weakened. At this stage, May probably feels insufficiently empowered to 
embrace as assertive a role as in her first speech.  
The third speech also illustrates May‟s manifest preference for her collective 
representation through the inclusive We-pronoun in mental processes with desiderative want 
(8 occurrences with I versus 30 with We-pronoun) (p<. 00), which does not apply in the first 
speech, where both uses are practically equal. This suggests a significant need on her part to 
project herself in association with the British people as she approaches the Brexit deadline 
(close to the third speech), by which time she had begun to receive severe criticism relating to 
her abilities as a negotiator. Such collectivization in laying out her desires may be understood 
as a covert means of expressing her wishes as if shared by all the British people, and hence 
also as a means of having the British people believe that what she desires for Britain is in the 
group‟s interest, a group to which she of course belongs as a British citizen. Finally, the third 
speech also has May present herself from the inclusive We-perspective, when we consider the 
sum of mental processes. With the plural pronoun outnumbering the singular by 89 to 22 
incidences (p<. 00), May shows a clear preference for representing mental processes in 
general in association with the British people. This trend for the sum of mental processes is 
not only significant in the third speech itself, but also from the first to the third, the We-
pronoun increasing from 43 to 89 occurrences across the time span of fourteen months. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
Considering the results, our two hypotheses appear to be borne out. The study confirms that 
there are significant changes between the speeches, affecting the representation of reality 
revolving around the prospect of a post-Brexit EU-UK trade relationship. Since these stand as 
landmarks on a timeline that would eventually lead to the British divorce from the EU, we can 
confirm that time has proved to be a significant variable in accounting both for changes in 
May‟s representation of reality and for her own projection as a social actor over time, 
specifically in the 14-month time span separating the first from the third speech. As discussed 
above, the choices of May‟s self-projection, either from an individualized I or from a 
collectivized We-perspective, also proved to be meaningful.  
It is important to contextualize these findings further, as they illustrate interesting 
aspects of May‟s strategic speech behaviour against the backdrop of Brexit. We should not 
lose sight of the fact that the three speeches, when taken together, imply a progressive 
“erosion” of May‟s power and reliability as a negotiator. As we move away from the 
landmark of the first speech (in which she presents herself, the newly appointed conservative 
leader and Prime Minister, as the renewed promise and hope for a post-Brexit outcome that 
would optimize Britain‟s trade relations with the EU) we find an ever more weakened 
politician. In the second speech she is seen to be under significant pressure, even criticized 
from within the ranks of her own party for the way in which she conducts negotiations. The 
third speech, closest in time to the initial deadline for the UK‟s divorce, finds May in the 
position of having suffered the outright rejection of the terms she has negotiated with the EU. 
May‟s choices of processes in the representation of reality, as encoded in her clause 
construction patterns, along with the choices she makes in projecting herself as a social actor 
in agentive position, acquire strategic significance in light of these ongoing political 
circumstances.  
Generally speaking, May was found to rely most importantly on mental processes, the 
relational and verbal counterparts being the least represented ones. For her persuasive talk, 
she seems then to attach special value to mental activity, to what is thought, believed, known 
or wanted. Relying on verbal representations would have made her embrace the role of 
communicator (e.g., I say, I tell you, I promise, I can guarantee), an oratory resource that she 
does not endow with persuasive effectiveness in the Brexit context. It is also interesting to 
note how scant relational processes are when we consider their potential, especially taking 
into account Halliday‟s (1994) categorization, which includes choices of expressing intensive 
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(e.g. We are a proud nation) or circumstantial processes of being (as in We are in an 
advantageous situation). Again, these identifying processes are not considered by May to 
carry significant persuasive weight in her speeches.  
What is of particular interest in this study is the choice of I versus We-pronoun made by 
May in agentive position, and particularly its strategic versatility depending on the process 
type and the specific speech in which these are used. If we bear in mind that political speeches 
are thoroughly prepared and linguistically controlled (Schaffner, 1996: 201) then her uses of I 
versus We, in combination with specific process types, are anything but random choices, an 
assertion that has been supported by statistically significant analysis in this study. In general, 
May has shown a clear preference for projecting herself as part of a group, the British people, 
encoded in the We-pronoun, rather than as an individualized self, most clearly in the third 
speech, aware as she is that her negotiations are being jeopardized by critical public opinion 
and members of Parliament. Presenting herself in association with the British people may be 
interpreted as a strategy of assimilation (Van Leeuwen, 1996: 50), where she steps aside from 
her role as an individual leader (her capacity of Prime Minister) to become a citizen. This, in 
turn, may be seen as an attempt to make the British people think that her interests are not her 
own but those of the British citizens; it might also be understood as a way of sharing or 
diluting political responsibility. This applies also to material processes in general as well, in 
which May presents herself in all three speeches much more frequently in association with the 
British people while referring to implementation of actions in general. Such specific 
assimilation may imply turning citizens as a group into involved agents as much as to 
implementing the changes that lie ahead. 
Van Leeuwen (1996: 48) observes that, given the great value nowadays placed on 
individuality in many spheres of society, the categories of assimilation versus 
individualization are of primary concern in CDA. In the case of May‟s Brexit speeches, the I 
versus We dichotomy has proved meaningful, yet, as discussed above, the most notable 
significance might in fact be found in the We-pronoun itself when used under specific 
circumstances of the representation of reality. Theresa May‟s strategic behaviour seems to 
hinge most crucially on assimilation, rather than on individualization. At times, the collective 
We points to mechanisms of diluting or sharing political responsibility, whereas other 
instances convey an enhancement of the British people as May‟s co-protagonists in the 
implementation of actions or changes. On other occasions, it may be understood as a means of 
turning May‟s wishes and desired outcomes into concerns of general interest, making her 
Theresa May’s representation                                                                                                                                            124         
 
      © Servicio de Publicaciones. Universidad de Murcia. All rights reserved.      IJES, vol. 20(3), 2020, pp. 109–127  
Print ISSN: 1578-7044; Online ISSN: 1989-6131  
  
mental activity coincide with that of the British people, or having them believe that she 
subsumes through the collective We the British people‟s concerns as her own. Assimilation 
could also imply a covert means of expressing her wishes in particular, as if shared by all the 
British people.  
This array of possible meanings contrasts with associations that other researchers have 
made when accounting for the possible interpretations of pronoun We in political speeches. 
Simon-Vandenbergen (1997) and Fairclough (2000) both argue that We may express 
solidarity between the speaker and the audience, understood as a means by which politicians 
make the addressees feel at one with them. While in May‟s speeches this assimilation is 
indeed expressed, solidarity does not seem to apply here. Simon-Vandenbergen (1987) and 
Hillier (2004) allude to the strategic ambiguity behind the use of We, in that it may be 
inclusive or exclusive of addressees and might also be used to conceal or be deliberately 
ambiguous about the referent. In the samples analyzed in the current study, all clauses with 
We in agentive position have been selected so as to refer to the British people/the UK. 
Although May is hence never ambiguous about such referents, her We-choices may be 
interpreted as being purposefully ambiguous about the relation between referents: thus, 
through the We-reference she may indistinctly convey her endorsement of the British people‟s 
interests, or the way in which the British people views coincide with her own. Chilton‟s 
(2004) conceptualization of group identity either as insiders or outsiders also applies here. In 
her manifest preference for the collective, We pronoun, May pursues a strong bond between 
the British people, herself as Prime Minister, and Britain, which are projected as one unit in 
relation to the European Union, thus maintaining a tension of insiders versus outsiders. 
Finally, Leung (2018) associates collective We with a way of expressing modesty or diverting 
excessive prominence away from the speaker. While modesty seems implausible, given the 
findings, May‟s preference for the plural pronoun (hence not embracing her individual role as 
Prime Minister) might be understood as a way of toning down her prominent power position 
and instead placing herself on an equal footing with the British people she represents. 
In some respect, May‟s projection as a We-agent resonates with Bull & Strawson‟s 
(2020) identification of her equivocal style, which implies a lack of clarity, confusion, or 
some form of concealment. The former president‟s We-choices can certainly be understood as 
a way of hiding as a social actor behind a collective group reference. Could our findings be 
said to uncover a specific style in May‟s delivery of speeches? I don‟t think so. We might 
instead see these as specific to the three seminal speeches delivered in the Brexit context, and 
as such may be of interest in the study of political oratory or for political scientists. It would 
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certainly be interesting in future research to test these findings against other speeches she has 
delivered in other political contexts. 
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